A free check I built, and the three DNS records that decide whether forged mail lands.
2026-08-18
Business email compromise does not usually start with a compromise. It starts with a domain that never published a DMARC record, which means anyone on the internet can send mail that appears to come from the finance director, and receiving servers have no instruction to stop it. No credentials, no malware, nothing on the target's network touched.
I have built a free check for it. Put in a domain, get a graded answer in about three seconds: Email Spoof Check.
SPF lists which servers may send mail for your domain. On its own it does not stop anyone forging the address a human actually sees.
DKIM cryptographically signs messages so a receiver can tell they were not altered in transit.
DMARC is the one that matters. It ties the other two to the visible From: address and tells receivers what to do when a message fails: nothing, quarantine it, or reject it outright. Without an enforcing DMARC policy the other two records are largely decorative.
This is deliberate and it is the only reason the tool can exist as a link rather than an engagement. Every lookup is a public DNS record, the same data any receiving mail server reads to decide whether to trust a message. Nothing is scanned, nothing is probed, and no authorisation is required. Active testing is a completely different tier with a completely different legal profile, and blurring the two is how people get themselves into trouble.
SPF and DMARC carry no such caveat. Those live at fixed, well known names, so an absent record genuinely means absent. Which, for a surprising number of small businesses, it is.